Declaring governance constraints, escalation rules, autonomy levels, and hash-linked provenance chains in agent declarations.
Capabilities without governance are unconstrained. Provenance without governance has no enforcement. Governance without provenance has no audit trail. Together, they make agents trustworthy and accountable.
Hard constraints are inviolable. Implementations MUST prevent violation. They are strings declaring absolute boundaries:
"hard": [
"Never scale beyond 3x in a single action",
"Never authorize expenditures above $10,000",
"Never modify production systems without approval"
]
They are enforced at the runtime level, not just advisory
Violation of a hard constraint is a system failure, not a judgment call
They apply to all capability operations regardless of pipeline
Multiple hard constraints are conjunctive (all must hold)
Soft constraints are preferences. They are passed to reasoning capabilities and MAY be overridden with evidence:
"soft": [
"Prefer gradual scaling over spikes",
"Prefer reversible actions over irreversible ones",
"Prefer consensus when multiple options score equally"
]
They inform reasoning but do not block action
A reasoning capability may override a soft constraint if it provides
evidence justifying the override
Overrides should be recorded in the provenance chain
They are advisory for non-reasoning capabilities
Escalation rules define when an agent MUST defer to a human:
"escalate_when": {
"confidence_below": 0.7,
"cost_exceeds_usd": 1000,
"hard_boundary_approached": true
}
| Trigger | Semantics |
|---|---|
confidence_below | Escalate if reasoning confidence drops below threshold |
cost_exceeds_usd | Escalate if action cost exceeds dollar amount |
hard_boundary_approached | Escalate if action is near a hard constraint boundary |
Triggers are disjunctive — any single trigger firing causes escalation.
The escalate_when object supports arbitrary key-value pairs. Providers interpret the triggers they understand and ignore the rest:
"escalate_when": {
"confidence_below": 0.6,
"latency_exceeds_ms": 5000,
"affected_users_above": 1000
}
The autonomy block controls proactive behavior:
"autonomy": {
"level": "advise",
"model_tier": "local_small",
"heartbeat_seconds": 300,
"budget": {
"max_actions_per_hour": 5,
"max_deliberation_calls_per_query": 1,
"require_approval_for": ["act", "propose"]
}
}
| Level | Behavior |
|---|---|
observe | Survey and log only. Take no action. Safe default for new deployments. |
advise | Propose actions, wait for approval. Typical production mode. |
act | Execute within budget constraints. Full autonomy for high-trust agents. |
| Tier | Target Hardware | Typical Budget |
|---|---|---|
local_small | 8B parameter models | Shallow deliberation, fast attention |
local_large | 70B+ parameter models | Deeper deliberation, broader attention |
cloud_frontier | Cloud-hosted frontier models | Full deliberation depth |
Autonomy levels compose hierarchically. An organization-level policy of advise will downgrade any agent declaring act:
Org policy: advise + Agent declaration: act → Effective: advise
Org policy: act + Agent declaration: advise → Effective: advise
The effective level is always the minimum of the org policy and the agent declaration. This is enforced by Delegatic governance policies.
When "provenance": true, every capability operation appends a hash-linked record to the provenance chain:
{
"source": "&time.anomaly",
"provider": "ticktickclock",
"operation": "detect",
"timestamp": "2026-03-14T14:23:07Z",
"input_hash": "sha256:a3f8...",
"output_hash": "sha256:7b2c...",
"parent_hash": "sha256:0000...",
"mcp_trace_id": "ttc-inv-9f3a..."
}
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
source | Capability that performed the operation |
provider | Provider that executed it |
operation | Operation name from the contract |
timestamp | ISO 8601 timestamp |
input_hash | SHA-256 hash of the input payload |
output_hash | SHA-256 hash of the output payload |
parent_hash | Hash of the previous record in the chain |
mcp_trace_id | MCP invocation trace ID |
Records form a chain via parent_hash. The first record in a pipeline references sha256:0000... (genesis). Each subsequent record references the previous record's hash. This creates an immutable, verifiable audit trail.
The provenance chain is queryable after pipeline execution. Use it for:
Audit: Trace which capabilities contributed to a decision
Debugging: Identify where a pipeline produced unexpected results
Compliance: Prove that governance constraints were respected
Reproducibility: Replay a pipeline with the same inputs
When capabilities compose, their governance constraints merge:
All hard constraints from all composed capabilities are collected into a single conjunctive set. None may be violated.
Soft constraints are collected and passed to reasoning capabilities. When soft constraints conflict, the reasoning capability decides based on evidence. The resolution is recorded in provenance.
Escalation triggers are merged disjunctively. If any trigger fires, escalation occurs. The most conservative trigger wins.
The effective autonomy level is the minimum across all governance sources (agent declaration, org policy, runtime override).
Delegatic is the governance provider in the [&] Protocol ecosystem. It manages:
Organization-level autonomy caps
Cross-agent governance policies
Escalation routing (who gets notified)
Approval workflows
Policy versioning and audit
When an agent declares &reason.argument with provider: "deliberatic", the governance block is passed to Deliberatic for enforcement. Delegatic policies can override agent-level governance when org-level constraints are stricter.
| Pattern | Description | Key Fields |
|---|---|---|
| Read-only observer | Agent monitors but never acts | level: "observe", no soft/hard needed |
| Advisor with guardrails | Agent proposes within bounds | level: "advise", hard constraints, escalation |
| Autonomous with budget | Agent acts within strict limits | level: "act", budget caps, hard constraints |
| Compliance-first | Full audit trail, conservative escalation | provenance: true, low confidence threshold |
| Multi-domain corroboration | Requires evidence from multiple capabilities | Hard constraint requiring multi-domain evidence |